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THE ROLE OF LAW IN EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
FRANK CLOUD COOKSEY*
The question of the proper role of law in the equal employment
opportunity field has been strongly debated for a number of years. 1
Some persons contend that this is an area in which the application
of law is inappropriate, either because such a law is unconstitutional,
unworkable, or undesirable Others feel that the enactment of law
in this area is a panacea for the problems of certain groups which
suffer unreasonable discrimination in our society and that the passage
and enforcement of equal employment legislation is the key to a
prompt solution to the problems of these groups. 3 A third position,
and the one adopted in this article, is that while the role of law is
limited, the law may be used as an effective tool in eliminating some
unreasonable discrimination in the area of hiring and other employ-
ment practices. The role of Iaw in this field, even if effectively drafted
and enforced, is but one of a number of legal and extra-legal avenues
to the gradual improvement of the economic status of groups which
suffer unreasonable discrimination. 4
I. THE LIMITATIONS TO THE ROLE OF LAW
An understanding of the limitations of the role of law in the equal
employment opportunity area is as essential to the formulation of a
workable statutory scheme as the conviction that regulation is needed.
The limited role which law may play in guaranteeing equal employment
opportunity comes home to me each morning as I proceed down a
crowded freeway toward the city of Houston. Quite frequently, I
listen to a radio program sponsored by "X Company." The broad-
cast is a newsy testimony to the advances of modern science. After
several minutes of information concerning new scientific discoveries,
* B.A., The University of Texas, 1955; LL.B., The University of Texas, 1962;
Member, State Bar of Texas, American Bar Association; Former Trial Attorney with
Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Assistant United States
Attorney, Southern District of Texas, Houston, Texas. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance of his wife, Lynn, in the preparation of this article for publication.
Please note that the views of the author are his own and do not necessarily express the
position of the Department of Justice.
1 See Cong. Q. Serv., Revolution In Civil Rights, 3-5, 21-25, 35, 36, 38 (1965).
• 2 See 110 Cong. Rec. 13077 (1964) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
3 See Hearings Before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee
on Education and Labor on H.R. 405 and similar bills, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 176, 181
(1963) (statement of Julius Hobson, then Chairman, Washington CORE).
4 During the 1964 presidential campaign much was said about the need of changing
the "hearts of men." This is an extra-legal avenue to change but it is by no means an
exclusive one. It is as futile to rely totally on such an extra-legal means to change as to
expect a miraculous cure to discrimination by the passage of legislation.
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an announcement is made to engineers inviting them to apply for
positions at "X Company's" plant near the Manned Spacecraft Center.
The announcer states that job applicants must have experience in
digital system design, computer programming, instrumentation, or te-
lemetry. He ends his spiel with this statement: "X Company is an
equal opportunity employer."
There is no apparent reason to doubt the truth of "X Company's"
claim to the status of "equal opportunity employer," but there is a
reason to doubt the significance of the fact to the vast majority of
American Negroes. All too few Negroes are trained and educated to
take advantage of scientific and engineering positions with "X Com-
pany."' This points up one of the basic limitations in equal employ-
ment opportunity legislation and enforcement. Such legislation can
attempt to eliminate unreasonable discrimination but it cannot
magically, by the touch of a wand, transform a person from a poorly
trained and educated individual to a college graduate who has achieved
a high degree of development of his individual talents and abilities .°
This is not to suggest that the educational factor alone is the
key to the solution of the employment problems of the American Negro
and other groups which have suffered from unreasonable discrimi-
nation.? However, it appears axiomatic that the first obstacle to be
overcome by Negroes in their search for equal employment opportu-
nities is the achievement of the education and training necessary to
perform the increasingly demanding tasks of a technologically sophis-
ticated society. Only when an individual is as fully trained and com-
petent as his competitor can he begin to register complaints concerning
unreasonable discrimination. The fact is that few employers will dis-
criminate on unreasonable grounds, even if they might be inclined to
do so, so long as there is a basis for denying a job or other benefits
of employment on the ground that the applicant lacks skill and
competence.'
The argument is sometimes made that employers should ignore
6 See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 773, S. 1210, S. 1211, and S. 1937,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 431-32 (1963) (remarks of Leslie Dunbar, Executive Director,
Southern Regional Council).
6 James Farmer, National Director, CORE, has recommended a crash program of
remedial education for Negro workers. See id. at 221 (upgrading of schools, business
sponsored training programs, union apprenticeship programs and government sponsored
retraining programs will have to be utilized to overcome the educational gap of the
Negro).
7
 For a brief statement outlining the pervasive nature of discrimination against the
Negro, see Mendelson, Discrimination 1-4 (1962).
:. 8 See Kopp, Management's Concern With Recent Civil Rights Legislation, 16 Lab.
L.J. 67, 71 (1965), for an indication of management's interest in ability tests, and Snow,
Equal Employment Opportunity, 2 Ga. State B.J. 27, 30 (1965), for suggestion of "bona
fide" reasons for refusal of employment.
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skill and competence, or at least minimize these factors as criteria,
in hiring Negroes.' The justification given for this approach is that
the Negro has been thwarted by the white man in his search for equal
opportunity and that, in order to compensate for years of oppression,
the Negro deserves favored treatment to overcome the gap created
by unreasonable discrimination. Such an approach overcomes the gap
of skill and competence by minimizing or ignoring these factors in
personnel decisions. It is doubtful that this answer to the problem
will, in the long run, best serve the interests of the Negro, because
it fails to account for the effect of these decisions on the Negroes
employed under such criteria or for the importance American em-
ployers attach to efficient production and the power they have to see
that efficiency is not undermined. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 ex-
plicitly rejected a course of .preferential treatment.'
Title VII does not guarantee the Negro a job under a quota sys-
tem, and neither does it assure him of the existence of job opportunities.
It is patently obvious that unemployment may result from a number of
factors other than discrimination. Economic stagnation or full scale
recession may be more damaging to the employment of Negroes, for
example, than the total effect of discrimination in hiring policies. There
is ample evidence to support the assertion that Negroes, as a group, are
the "last hired and the first fired," and the existence of widespread un-
employment would add greatly to the problem. 11 The effect of automa-
tion on the job market also bears heavily on the Negro, since he is
usually less able to function in newly created jobs requiring a high
degree of training and generally performs the less highly skilled tasks
which are being eliminated from the job market. None of these prob-
lems will be solved by the enforcement of equal employment opportu-
nity legislation.
More will be said later in this article about enforcement of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, but it should be noted here that one of the
limitations of the role of law in this field is the inherent difficulty of
enforcement. The field of personnel decisions is one which is replete
with subjective decisions and judgments. 12 Promotion may depend not
only on our employer's knowledge of our production and efficiency, but
on his judgment concerning our ability to get along with others, and on
0 But see exchange between Roy Wilkins, Executive Director, NAACP, and Senator
Joseph Clark, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the
Senate Committee On Labor and Public Welfare, supra note 5, at 204, and remarks of
James Farmer, id. at 225, in which both Negro leaders express opposition to such an
approach.
to §§ 703(h), (j).
11 See Manpower Report of the President and A Report On Manpower Requirements,
Resources, Utilization and Training 43-44 (1963).
12 See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31
Brooklyn L. Rev. 62, 63 (1964).
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our attitudes toward others with whom we might be working in a par-
ticular capacity. These factors are only illustrative of various subjec-
tive judgments in personnel decisions." The most carefully drawn
statute and the most vigorous enforcement will not be able to eliminate
some unreasonable discrimination from entering judgments of this
type.
Even when ascertainable discrimination exists, the law will be
limited in providing solutions due to the very slowness of its operation.
Indeed, even if Title VII had been drafted to enable the quickest pos-
sible action, the requirements of due process and fairness due those
answering unlawful practice charges would require time-consuming in-
vestigation and consideration by the Commission. This slow action is
in the nature of the quasi-judicial and judicial processes. It is not likely
to be eliminated.
In spite of the limitations discussed above, the role of law is im-
portant and necessary in the elimination of unreasonable discrimina-
tion. The law can undoubtedly be utilized to eliminate the more overt
types of discrimination, and a properly drafted and enforced piece of
legislation should be a catalyst in the process of reducing the more
covert discriminatory practices.
II. THE ROLE OF LAW AND CRITERIA FOR AN
EFFECTIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
If law is to be used to eliminate certain types of unreasonable dis-
crimination in employment relations, what is the proper subject of such
legislation? What is "unreasonable" discrimination? Why is it "unrea-
sonable"? What is the law seeking to accomplish?
Our nation has declared, in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, that certain employment practices are unlawful. Basically, dis-
crimination on the basis of an individual's "race, color, religion, sex or
national origin" is prohibited.14 In effect, Congress has declared that
this type of discrimination is unreasonable." Decisions and practices
based upon other discriminatory factors are not prohibited. Why these
categories of discrimination are prohibited can only be ascertained by
an analysis of the history and the values of the American people." For
our purposes, it is sufficient to say that the nation, through Congress,
18 For suggestions of other criteria which may still be utilized by employers in
personnel decisions, see Kammhoiz, Civil Rights Problems in Personnel and Labor Rela-
tions, 53 Ill. B,J. 464, 470, 476 (1965).
14 §§ 703(a)-(d), 704(a), (b).
15
 For a concise statement of Title VII's basic purpose, see 110 Cong. Rec. 13078
(1964) (remarks of Senator Cooper).
10
 For a short history of fair employment legislation, see Mendelson, supra note 7, at
70-75.
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has forcefully expressed itself. 17 There is little doubt as to how the
nation defines unreasonable discrimination.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was designed to guarantee equal
opportunity in the job market to all citizens regardless of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. The act attempts to eliminate those fac-
tors from consideration in personnel decisions and to allow other fac-
tors such as training, ability, performance, efficiency and capacity to
be determinative. The achievement of this goal depends in large part
on whether the law was effectively drafted. How is one to judge the
merits of a statutory scheme designed to help eliminate unreasonable
discrimination in employment? The criteria listed below are some of
the more important requisites of effective legislation in this field:'
(1) The law should be constitutionally valid.
(2) The law should prohibit all categories of unreasonable dis-
crimination which might occur in the employment field.
(3) The law should cover all persons and institutions which might
be engaged in unreasonable discrimination.
(4) The law should give relief to all persons who might be the
victims of unreasonable discrimination.
(5) The law should provide a complaint oriented procedure which
may result in a full investigation of and remedy for all dis-
criminatory practices followed by the employer involved.
(6) The law should provide for a clear and simple complaint pro-
cedure consistent with methods used in reporting other types
of discrimination.
(7) The law should provide clear jurisdictional definitions which
establish one forum for a given classification of discrimina-
tory conduct.
(8) The law should enable one to obtain the speediest remedy
possible within the limits imposed by the necessity of ad-
equate ascertainment of the facts.
(9) The law should require the keeping of sufficient records to
permit an evaluation of alleged discriminatory conduct in the
making of personnel decisions.
The evaluation of the provisions of Title VII which follows is con-
ducted in terms of the above criteria. These standards are proposed as
the minimum objectives which must be achieved if a statutory scheme
is to be effective.
17 See 110 Cong. Rec. 13082-83 (1964) (speech by Senator Humphrey in favor of
Title VII).
18 For other suggested criteria, see statement of Hon. John F. Henning, Under Secre-
tary of Labor, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, supra note 5, at 100, and statement of
Jacob Sheinkraan, id. at 465-66.
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III. DOES TITLE VII MEET THE TEST?
A. Constitutional Validity . and Coverage
There is little question that the framers of Title VII did an excel-
lent job in providing a solid constitutional foundation for the legisla-
tion.'° The power of Congress to regulate commerce has been utilized
in an appropriate manner, and there can be no doubt about the con-
stitutional validity of the statute after the Supreme Court's decisions
in the McCiung2° and Heart of Atlanta" cases. The framers deftly
avoided basing the legislation on the fourteenth amendment, and doubt-
lessly avoided considerable difficulty by doing so.
The wisdom of the Congress in providing adequate coverage in the
statute matches its foresightedness in avoiding constitutional entangle-
ments. Every important classification of unreasonable discrimination is
prohibited.' The prohibitions reach almost every important employ-
ment relationship from hiring to firing. The few exceptions limiting the
statutory coverage are negligible in effect. 23
Title VII therefore meets the tests of the first four criteria sug-
gested in part II above, and further elaboration on the coverage of the
act is left to a fellow contributor to this symposium.
B. Complaint Procedure
Much has been said about the merits of the complaint oriented
procedure provided by Title VII. Negro leaders have been extremely
critical of limiting the action of the Commission to the investigation of
complaints registered by aggrieved individuals?' Persons who have
studied the operation of the state fair employment agencies have also
attacked this approach. 23
 The difficulty with these criticisms has been
the failure of critics to suggest how one would establiSh priorities in
investigating the various employers, unions, and employment agencies
which might be guilty of discrimination if a complaint oriented pro-
cedure was not used. On the other hand, there is merit to the charge
that a complaint procedure which results only in the investigation of an
individual complainant's grievance is inadequate.
19
 See 110 Cong. Rec. 6988-91 (1964) (statement on constitutionality).
20
 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
21
 Heart of Atlanta Mote!, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
22 §§ 703(a)-(d), 704 (), (b).
23 §§ 703(e)-(j). The most important exceptions are those contained in §§ 703(e),
(h).
24
 See comments of James Farmer, Hearings Before the Subcommittee On Employ-
ment and Manpower of the Senate Committee On Labor and Public Welfare, supra note
5, at 221; statement of Roy Wilkins, id. at 199; statement of Herbert Hill, Labor Secre-
tary of NAACP, Hearings Before the General Subcommittee On Labor of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, supra note 3, at 142-43 (1963).
25 See Hill, Twenty Years of State- Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A
Critical Analysis With Recommendations, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 22, 24 (1964).
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A complaint oriented procedure which results in a full investiga-
tion of a particular employer's personnel practices may be the most
acceptable means of producing the maximum effect in the application
of law in the equal employment area. This is particularly true if the
employer is thereby subjected to an adequate remedy should discrim-
ination exist. Such an approach provides an adequate solution to dis-
crimination on an employer by employer or union by union basis. It
avoids the allegation of "fishing expedition" on the part of employers
and unions by conducting investigations only in connection with com-
plaints filed by individuals who have allegedly suffered discriminatory
treatment. Yet it provides an investigation and remedy which reaches
beyond the individual grievance.
Does Title VII provide the kind of investigatory and remedial pro-
cedures necessary to make a complaint oriented approach effective?
There is reason to doubt that- it does. The argument can be made that
the investigation permitted by section 706 must be limited to a con-
sideration of the individual case and that the relevant evidence will be
very narrow in scope.26 It would then follow that the Commission has
no authority to conduct an investigation broad enough to reveal a pat-
tern and practice of discrimination 27
There is an alternative theory which would allow cooperation
between the Commission and the Attorney General and authorize in-
vestigations which are wider in scope. One can contend that the pattern
of treatment of a class of individuals by a particular employer, labor
organization or employment agency is relevant in determining whether
Unlawful discrimination has taken place. A pattern of past discrimina-
tory treatment would be some evidence of unlawful discrimination in
a particular case. On this basis, the Commission could conduct a
thorough investigation of discriminatory practices by a given employer
before arriving at a decision on a particular complaint. Evidence of a
pattern or practice of discrimination could then be delivered to the
Department of justice for the consideration of the Attorney General.
If the Attorney General concluded that there was reasonable cause to
believe that a pattern or practice of discrimination existed, then a civil
action could be initiated under section 707.
26
 Section 710 provides that the Commission shall have authority to examine wit-
nesses under oath and to require the production of documentary evidence relevant or
material to the charge under investigation. Section 706 states that the Commission may
conduct an investigation whenever it is charged in writing under oath by a person claim-
ing, to be aggrieved that a covered institution has engaged in an unlawful employment
practice. In § 703 unlawful employment practices are defined in terms of discrimination
against "any individual." Therefore, the charge is related to discrimination against an
individual.
27
 Since the Commission itself has only the conciliatory, powers granted in § 706(a),
the restriction of its investigatory powers would rob it of any major significance.
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A possible difficulty with the latter approach is the prohibition
contained in section 706 which reads as follows:
Nothing said or done during and as a part of such en-
deavors may be made public by the Commission without the
written consent of the parties, or used as evidence in a subse-
quent proceeding.
"Such endeavors" presumably refers to all of the investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Commission. If the testimony taken un-
der oath and the documentary evidence accumulated in Commission
investigations may not be turned over to the Attorney General for his
consideration because this would make "public" such information, then
the sponsors of Title VII have been frustrated in a way which they did
not anticipate. Senator Humphrey certainly foresaw close cooperation
between the Justice Department and the Commission, 28 and the pref-
erable interpretation of this prohibition would exclude the sharing of
information between governmental agencies from its coverage. Surely
the Commission was not given the power to "refer matters" to the
Attorney General for the institution of a suit under section 707 without
being given the authority to reveal the evidence supporting such refer-
rals.2°
The discussion above postulates an effective method of operation
under the complaint oriented procedure of Title VII. The courts will
have to grant the Commission powers to conduct investigations which
may yield evidence of pattern of discrimination, and the Commis-
sion will have to maintain close cooperation with the Justice Depart-
ment in order for these results to be achieved. 30 In addition, there is
one more prerequisite which must be fulfilled: The whole scheme will
fail if complaints are not submitted by individuals who have suffered
discriminatory treatment.'
If one attempts to put himself in the position of a person who has
been discriminated against by an employer, labor organization or em-
ployment agency, he may gain some insight into the chaos of the civil
rights enforcement. Generally, the complaining party is not one who
is well versed in the law, much less a person who has made a detailed
study of Title VII.32
 He is a person with a feeling that he has been dis-
28 See 110 Cong. Rec. 13693 (1964).
29
 See § 705
 (g) (6) *
so Such cooperation between federal agencies is stymied all too often by institutional
jealousies.
81 On October 4, 1965, Commission Chairman Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. announced
a $165,000 grant to Wayne State University in Detroit to conduct a nationwide research
project in the area of patterns of discrimination in employment. The press release stated:
"The study aims to shed light on criticisms that a strict complaint action procedure does
not fulfill the spirit of the equal employment opportunity laws."
82 It is unlikely that he will have even seen one of the notices required by § 711.
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criminated against in some aspect of employment relations. If he is a
Negro, it is possible that he has been the victim of discrimination in
other areas, including voting rights, schools, public facilities or public
accommodations. He will be frustrated if he chooses to register his un-
lawful employment practice complaint in the same form he has used in
reporting other types of discrimination. If he were erudite in the law,
the complainant would know that no less than three different methods
of registering complaints are appropriate under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964: Under Title II, an oral complaint is enough to initiate an in-
vestigation;" under Titles III" and IV,' written complaints are re-
quired; to comply with Titles V" and VII," one must file a complaint
in writing under oath. To add to the confusion, jurisdiction to deal with
the complaint may be in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion," the Department of Justice," the President's Committee on
Equal Employment Opportunity,' the Community Relations Service,'
or the National Labor Relations Board," not to mention the overlap-
ping jurisdiction of state agencies. This confused state of affairs pre-
vails in all areas of civil righ6 investigation and enforcement and has
been the subject of critical comment.' It is as equally distressing to
the complainant as to his employer."
No less confusing than the lack of uniformity in the required form
of complaints and the myriad of agencies to which one might direct his
grievance" are the time limitations within which one may seek relief.
33 Since a specific form is not spelled out, an oral complaint is acceptable.
S4 § 301( a).
35 § 907(a).	 •
§ 504ta) or § 104(a) of Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 635, 42 U.S.C. § 1975c
(1964).
37
 § 706(a).
38 Ibid.
39 § 707.
48 Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961); Exec. Order No. 11114, 28 Fed.
Reg. 6485 (1963).
41 § 1002.
42 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172
(1963); Independent Metal Workers (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
45 Cong. Q. Serv., supra note 1, at 76.
44 See Kopp, supra note 8, at 76-77.
45 The complainant's confusion could be alleviated somewhat by placing responsi-
bility for the receipt and referral of civil rights complaints with the Civil. Rights Com-
mission. A simple written complaint, not under oath, sould be required in all instances.
The Civil Rights Commission could evaluate the complaints received and refer them to the
proper agency for action. This would enable that Commission to keep records which
permit evaluation of the performance of various agencies in dealing with civil rights
complaints. It would also allow uniform policy on jurisdiction. The effectiveness of such
a system would depend upon widespread publicity being given to it and the creation of a
staff which could process complaints and refer them quickly and efficiently. The Civil
Rights Commission could perform this role under the authority of § 104(a) (4) of
Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 635, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1975c (1964).
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Instead of setting one basic time limitation for the registration of com-
plaints with the Commission, .the statute suggests three." Then, even
if the layman overcomes the obstacle of filing his complaint in proper
form with the proper agency in the proper time, he must meet the fur-
ther requirement of filing his lawsuit within the proper time should
compliance not be achieved through state action or voluntary com-
pliance.47
In essence, the complaint procedure in the Civil Rights Act is a
stumbling-block to enforcement, not a simple procedural tool which
may be utilized in the efficient processing of grievances. The require-
ments of the statute are Confusing and burdensome to the individual
who has suffered some form of discrimination. Even if the complaint is
properly registered, it is possible that the courts may restrict the scope
of Commission investigations and prevent close cooperation between
the Commission and the Department of Justice. If that occurs, the best
complaint procedure will be meaningless.
C. Jurisdictional Definitions
Reference has already been made to the jurisdictional confusion
which prevails in the equal employment area. One of the basic results
of Title VII is to allow state fair employment agencies to continue their
work in the field.48
 Under Title X, the Community Relations Service
may conceivably play a role in employment disputes." Title V specif-
ically provides that the Civil Rights Commission shall serve as a
national clearing house for information in respect to denials of equal
protection in the field of employment." Executive Order 10925 pro-
vides for a Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity in the area
of government contracts," and the NLRB has exercised its powers in
matters involving discrimination by unions. 52
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act compounded the confusion of
overlapping jurisdiction rather than eliminating it. Exclusive jurisdic-
tion over employment problems was not placed in the Commission but
was shared with state commissions and other federal agencies. The
49 § 706(d).
47 § 706(e).
48
 §§ 706(b)-(d), 709(b).
,49 To allow.
 the Community Relations Service such a role would be ridiculous since
its function in such a case would be conciliatory, thus duplicating the function of the
Commission.
5O' § 104(a)(4) of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 635, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1975c (1964).
91
 This Committee's functions have been transferred to the Department of Labor.
which has other responsibilities in the area of government contracts. Exec. Order No.
11296, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965).
52
 For a discussion of NLRB decisions in this area, see Rosen, The Law and Racial
Discrimination in Employment, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 729, 781-98 (1965).
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Civil Rights Act thus failed to establish one forum for each classifica-
tion of discriminatory conduct in the field of employment or to place
exclusive jurisdiction over all employment discrimination in the hands
of the Commission.
D. Speed of the Remedial Process
Note has already been taken of the slowness of the judicial process
in dealing with problems in the employment area." The statutory
scheme of Title VII does something to contribute to a speedier consid-
eration of employment problems by providing certain time limitations
for the handling of complaints by state agencies and the Commission."
On the other hand, the mere fact that the Iaw requires referral of prob-
lems to state agencies is a factor which can slow the handling of com-
plaints by sixty days." Of course, the real slowness of remedial action
occurs when either the individual complainant" or the Department of
Justice" is forced to bring suit in order to obtain compliance. Since the
Commission does not have the power to issue cease and desist orders
upon reaching its conclusions, the process of factual determination
must be duplicated by the court in reaching a decision.u 8 This time con-
suming process leaves much to be desired.
The importance of quick action to the individual complainant
should be apparent. A person who has suffered from discrimination in
hiring policies cannot wait , forever to obtain a job. He must earn his
living in the here and now, and even an award of pay from the date of
discriminatory action will not answer the problem of meeting present
expenses. Every unnecessary obstacle to remedial action is a further
discouragement to those who might be inclined to complain of discrim-
inatory treatment. The longer the process, the less inclined the indi-
vidual will be to complain.
E. Record Keeping Requirements
The argument will be heard that the keeping of records which re-
flect the race, color, religion, sex and national origin of a job applicant
or employee will promote discrimination rather than eliminate it, and
anguished cries will be heard from some businessmen that the ever in-
53 For specific examples of the slow remedy which the law provides, see Hill, supra
note 25, at 33-35.
54 §§ 706(b), (e).
55 § 706(b).
56 § 706(e). The right of an individual complainant to bring suit was finally con-
ceived as the basic enforcement device in Title VII. Although this right will remain im-
portant to some individuals, the § 707 suits are more effective in curing widespread
discrimination in employment.
87 § 707.
58 For excellent discussion of judicial enforcement, see Ranney, Enforcement of Fair
Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 430, 453-69 (1965).
427
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
creasing burden of record keeping has become intolerable and that no
additional records should be required by the Commission." The fact
remains, however, that the record keeping requirements are the heart
of Title VII. Without adequate records reflecting the race, color, reli-
gion, sex and national origin of the applicants and employees, the
problem of proving discriminatory treatment is almost insurmount-
able."
Title VII grants the Commission sufficient power to ordain the
keeping of necessary records." The Commission may require such
records to be kept as it considers reasonable, necessary and appropriate
for the enforcement of the Equal Employment Opportunity Title of
the Act. This power is qualified in a way which may cause some dif-
ficulty in certain judicial districts in the deep South. Section 709 (c)
provides that any employer, employment agency, labor organization
or joint labor-management committee which believes that the applica-
tion to it of any of the Commission's record keeping requirements
would result in undue hardship may bring a civil action for appropriate
relief in the United States district court in the district where such
records are kept. Hopefully, the concept of "undue hardship" will be
narrowly construed, but there is no guarantee that this will be the case.
It would indeed be paradoxical if the courts took away with one clause
what Congress granted with another.
The role of law in the equal employment field can be fulfilled only
through adequate provisions for coverage and enforcement. While the
coverage of Title VII is excellent, the enforcement provisions may
prove inadequate.
IV. A COMMENT ON SEX
A great deal has been said about how the prohibition against dis-
crimination on the basis of sex crept into the definition of unlawful
employment practice in Title VII . 2
 Although it may be true that the
"sex" amendment was adopted without opportunity for serious evalua-
tion of its effect, there can be little sympathy with the position that
some action of this type was not needed. The degree to which this pro-
hibition will affect American employment practices will largely depend
on Commission and judicial interpretation of the so-called "bona fide
occupational qualification" exception in section 703(e).
It has been suggested that this "bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion" test could be used to continue the exclusion of women from a
50
 See Where Civil Rights Went Wrong, Nation's Business, November 1965, p. 66.
00
 Any person who has ever attempted to show a pattern or practice of discrimina-
tion in a voting case will never forget the importance of racial designations in such
records.
61 g 709(c).
62
 See Cong. Q. Serv., Revolution in Civil Rights 49 (1965).
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number of jobs." The writer of a note in the Iowa Law Review ex-
pressed his own views and the hopes of many employers in this way:
"However, one saving exception is available to the employer, agency,
or labor organization that wishes to classify on the basis of sex."" The
"saving exception" referred to allows the employer or labor organiza-
tion. to discriminate on the basis of religion, sex or national origin in
certain instances where religion, sex or national origin is a "bona fide
occupational qualification", reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of that particular business or enterprise. The interpretation of
what is "reasonably necessary" will be the task of the courts and the
Commission, and the guidelines established will largely depend on the
values of those who are interpreting this rather vague phraseology.
One would hope that the Commission and the courts will confine
the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception to narrow limits.
If the exception is used simply to confirm the culturally accepted stan-
dards of what work a woman or man should be doing, the prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of sex will be rendered meaningless.
A particular individual applying for a job should be judged on his or
her own merits, not on the basis of fancied sexual characteristics
attributed to the group to which he or she belongs."
Many "sacred cows" should die during the next few years as the
prohibition against sexual discrimination is applied. Laws which pro-
hibit women from performing certain physical tasks will probably fall
by the wayside. Likewise, legislation and contractual agreements which
provide special wages, overtime pay or rest periods for women could
be eliminated. The Commission has already announced that it con-
siders restrictions on the employment or continued employment of
married women an unlawful practice if such restrictions are not also
applied to married men."
The inclusion in Title VII of the prohibition against discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex was perhaps fortuitous, but this does not mean
that one should immediately begin to explore clever devices to render
it meaningless. Perhaps the Commission and the courts will utilize this
opportunity to begin a new era of creative responsibility for Americans
of both sexes.
65 Businessmen hope to be consulted when guidelines are established by the Corn-
mission for the interpretation of § 703(e).
64 Note, Classification of the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50 Iowa L.
Rev. 778, 792 (1965). The author made this point at 796: "Thus, where a woman
applies for a job as a barber, the employer can establish his case merely by showing that
hiring her would cause him to lose a significant number of patrons." He might be inter-
ested to know that the attractive blonde I saw through the window of the Houston
Barber College a short while ago did not seem to provoke that reaction.
65 Wilma Rudolph is certainly better qualified to run the 100-yard dash than most
men, and I would assume that some men might make better nurses than some women.
60 EEOC Opinion Letter, Sept. 9, 1965, BNA, L.R.X. 1879.
429
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
V. CONCLUSION
The role of law in the area of equal employment opportunity is a
limited one. Yet, one can scarcely feel that the role of law has reached
its full potential or effectiveness within the present framework of Title
VII. The complaint and enforcement provisions of the title will prob-
ably need revision if the desired goal of equal employment opportuhity
is to be realized to the full extent possible under Iaw. There will be
vociferous opposition to the strengthening of the powers of the Com-
mission," and the present legal framework may prevail for several
years before significant changes are made. Of course, it is possible that
experience may prove the present scheme more feasible than is appar-
ent. Some time will certainly have to pass before the feasibility of
shared state and federal responsibility in this area is tested. Of one
thing we may be certain, however. With the passage of time the law will
increasingly play a major role in the creation and maintenance of equal
employment opportunity. Its effective operation could be one of the
most significant contributions to the alleviation of unreasonable dis-
crimination in our lifetime. The failure of effective operation of law in
this area could be damaging to our society in ways which one hesitates
to contemplate.
67 Supra note 59, at 60-73.
430
